Key Points
Introduction: Explains why leaving the built-in Administrator account enabled increases exposure to brute-force and credential-guessing attacks (it’s a well-known, high-privilege target), and why disabling it is recommended as an account-hardening step.
Quick setup: Shows how to detect the Built-in Administrator account is not disabled misconfiguration in Vulnerability Manager Plus and provides the exact Windows steps to disable the account consistently across managed endpoints (typically via Local Security Policy / GPO for centralized enforcement).
Frequently Asked Questions: Covers practical questions about Chrome Safe Browsing, including what it is, why it should be enabled in enterprise environments, what risks arise if it is disabled, whether it blocks unsafe sites automatically, how to verify the setting on endpoints, how to enforce it using Group Policy, potential performance impact, privacy/compliance considerations, limitations of the protection, and what to do after applying the policy.
The built-in Administrator account is a default local account with full privileges. Unlike regular accounts, it cannot be locked out even after repeated failed sign-in attempts, which makes it an easy and persistent target for password-guessing and brute-force attacks.
If your environment doesn’t rely on this account for routine administration, keep it disabled and use named admin accounts instead. This reduces the risk of attackers targeting a predictable, always-present entry point—especially on endpoints that may be exposed to remote sign-in paths or used outside trusted networks.
If you need it for emergency recovery, treat it as a break-glass account: keep it disabled by default, enable it only when required, and protect it with a strong password and strict access controls.
You can detect this misconfiguration (Built-in Administrator Account is not disabled) using Vulnerability Manager Plus. This misconfiguration comes under the category of User Account Management and has a Critical severity.
To detect this misconfiguration:
To remediate the misconfiguration using Group Policy:
This remediation does not require reboot.
Scheduling reports keeps teams informed without needing to log in manually.
Refer to this page to know in detail more about misconfiguration hardening
The built-in Administrator account is a default local Windows account that has full administrative privileges. It is created during OS installation and is intended primarily for initial setup and recovery scenarios.
You can disable it through Group Policy (recommended for consistency) by setting Accounts: Administrator account status to Disabled under Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> Security Options. You can also disable it locally using Local Security Policy or Computer Management on individual machines.
Yes—in most environments, disabling it is a recommended hardening step because it removes a predictable, high-privilege target. Ensure you have at least one other approved admin account (local or domain) available before disabling it.
Because it is a well-known account with elevated rights, attackers often target it for password guessing, brute-force attempts, and lateral movement. Disabling it reduces unnecessary exposure—especially on endpoints that don’t require it.
Renaming can reduce obvious targeting, but it still leaves a high-privilege account enabled. For stronger hardening, disable it where it isn’t needed and use named admin accounts. If you must keep it, consider renaming it and tightly controlling access.
Not if you have another admin-capable account available (for example, a domain admin account, a managed local admin account, or a separate named local admin). Always validate alternative admin access before rolling out the change broadly.
You can check locally in Computer Management > Local Users and Groups > Users, where a disabled account typically shows as disabled. You can also verify via policy results (for example, gpresult) if the setting is enforced by GPO.
In the applicable GPO, navigate to Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> Security Options, then set Accounts: Administrator account status to Disabled. Apply the GPO to the correct OU and update policy on endpoints.
No. This setting targets the local built-in Administrator account. Domain admin accounts and other named local admin accounts continue to work based on their permissions and group memberships.
After applying the policy, confirm the setting is enforced on endpoints, test access using your approved admin accounts, and monitor authentication logs for repeated failed attempts that may indicate brute-force activity or misconfigured credentials.